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LIMITATIONS ON AIR CARRIER LIABILITY: AN
INADVERTENT RETURN TO COMMON LAW
PRINCIPLES
EUGENE WESLEY ALBERT

I.

INTRODUCTION

W

ITH THE PASSAGE of the Airline Deregulation Act 1
and the Air Cargo Deregulation Act,2 Congress dismantled an extensive regulatory structure that had governed the
rights and liabilities of shippers, passengers and air carriers
since 1938.' Much of this regulation has been accomplished
through the use of tariffs,4 which set out the rates and practices of air carriers, including limitations on liability.' These
tariffs have been filed with the Civil Aeronautics Board
(Board) and once approved by the Board as reasonable, have
been upheld by the courts even if the tariffs were inconsistent
with common law rules. The deregulation acts have mandated
a return to common law principles after almost fifty years of
regulatory control.
This comment will examine this return to common law
principles, looking at the soon to be abolished regulatory
structure, the deregulation acts, and the common law govI

Airline Deregulation Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-504 § 102, 92 Stat. 1705-54

(1978).
Air Cargo Deregulation Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-163, 91 Stat. 1278-89 (1977).
See 49 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1552 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
4 A tariff is a public document setting forth the services of a carrier being offered,
the rates and charges with respect to those services and the governing rules, and regulations and practices relating to those services. International Tel. & Tel. v. United
Tel. Co. of Fla., 433 F. Supp. 352, 357 n.4 (M.D. Fla. 1975).
* See infra notes 20-26 and accompanying text.
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erning domestic6 common carriers.7 Most common carriers
have been subject to regulation for some time, therefore the
ultimate result of the deregulation of liability limitations has
yet to be determined. At best the law in this area is uncertain
and perhaps courts today may not approach liability limitations in the same manner they did fifty years ago when judicial attitudes towards liability limitations and contracts of adhesion were more tolerant.
II.

THE REGULATORY SCHEME

A.

Early Air Travel
In the early days of air travel, the common law of common
carriers governed an air carrier's attempt to limit its tort and
contract liability.8 As a common carrier, the early airlines
owed passengers and shippers a very high standard of care.'
Many commentators feared that without some limitation on
liability, potential tort damages would cripple the young,
struggling industry. 10 It was thought that some share of the
* The Warsaw Convention, officially known as the Convention for the Unification
of Certain Rules Relating to International Transportation by Air, Oct. 12, 1929, 49
Stat. 3000, T.S. No. 876, 137 L.N.T.S. 11 [hereinafter cited as Warsaw Convention]
controls the liability of air carriers in international transit.
7 A common carrier holds itself out to the public as willing to carry all passengers
for hire indiscriminately. Such "holding out" may be established by advertising. McClusker v. Curtiss-Wright Flying Serv., Inc., 269 Ill. App. 502 (1933), reprinted in
[1933] U.S. Av. R. 105. Private carriers do not owe passengers and shippers the same
high standard of care that common carriers do. Sleezer v. Lang, 170 Neb. 239, 102
N.W.2d 435 (1960).
* See, e.g., Curtiss-Wright Flying Serv., Inc. v. Glose, 66 F.2d 710 (3d Cir. 1933),
cert. denied, 290 U. S.696 (1934); Conklin v. Canadian-Colonial Airways, Inc., 266
N.Y. 244, 194 N.E. 692 (1935).
* Conklin v. Canadian-Colonial Airways, Inc., 266 N.Y. 244, 194 N.E. 692 (1935).
'o See, e.g., W. DAvis, AERONAUTICAL LAW 313-24 (1930) ("There seems to be a tendency on the part of the public and the courts to apply very strict rules of liability
towards air transport ... [Instead, the law should] aid this form of transportation
which will in the future play such a large part in the development of the country");
McDermott, Common CarrierLiability Applied to Carriersby Air, 23 A.B.A. J. 703,
705 (1937) ("there is a possibility that this new method of transportation, which has
proved itself a very useful and important one and which in many respects has no
substitute, may be throttled by too strict a liability"); Rittenberg, Limitation of Airline PassengerLiability, 6 J. AIR L. 365 (1935)("One of the greatest obstacles to [the
end of a firm financial foundation for air carriers] is contingent tort liability").
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risk resulting from the inherent dangers and incomplete development of air transportation should be carried temporarily
by the shipper and passenger as a concession to this new form
of travel in order to guarantee the continued existence of the
air transportation industry.1 1
In addition, early commercial air carriers experienced difficulty obtaining liability insurance because insurers were reluctant to take a risk on an industry whose losses could not be
predicted adequately. 12 Some commentators viewed limitations on liability as a vehicle to encourage insurers to aid carriers entering the field. 13 Air carriers could then offer reasonable rates and still be guaranteed a reasonable return.
Aside from considerations of potential liability, many did
not consider competition to be particularly beneficial to the
airline industry or the public. Indeed, it was generally thought
that the troubled business conditions of the air carrier industry during the 1930's were caused in part by the destructive
competition of too many air carriers.14 The established air carriers feared that without regulation, unsubsidized air carriers
using inferior equipment and paying lower wages would lure
business away from the established carriers to the detriment
of the public at large.1 '
B.

Regulation
With the above considerations in mind, Congress enacted
the Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938,10 which was essentially reenacted in the Federal Aviation Act of 1958 (Act).' 7 These
" McDermott, supra note at 10, at 704. See also Law v. Trancontinental Air
Transp., Inc., [1931] U.S. Av. R. 205 (E.D. Pa.); Herndon v. Gregory, 190 Ark. 702, 81
S.W.2d 849 (1935).
" See Rhyne, Liability Problems of Air Cargo Carriage, 15 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 69 (1950); Rittenberg, supra note 10, at 391.
I Id.
4 See generally Kelleher, Deregulation and the PracticingAttorney, 44 J. AIR L.
& COM. 261, 263 (1978).
Kelleher, supra note 14, at 263-64.
, Pub. L. No. 706, 52 Stat. 973 (current version at 49 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1552 (1976 &
Supp. IV 1980)).
" Pub. L. No. 85-726, 72 Stat. 737 (current version at 49 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1552 (1976
& Supp. IV 1980)). The Federal Aviation Act transferred safety functions from the
Civil Aeronautic Board to a new Federal Aviation Administration.
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acts established the Civil Aeronautics Board, granting it broad
powers to govern the economic conditions of the commercial
air industry.' 8 No person could engage in air transportation
without first obtaining a certificate of public convenience and
necessity from the Board.' 9 Air carriers were required to file
detailed tariffs with the Board, which set out the carriers's
rates, rules, practices and services. 20 Departure from the established tariffs constituted a criminal offense." Congress also
gave the Board power to prohibit any existing or proposed
rates, rules or practices that it found unjust or unreasonable.2 2
The Board could also temporarily suspend existing rates or
practices that it believed to be objectionable pending an investigation.2

The Board promulgated numerous economic

regulations under the Federal Aviation Act, ruling on the reasonableness of airline tariffs. 2 4 Although the Act did not ex-

pressly require that limitations on liability be included in tar25
the Board interpreted its statutory power to govern

iffs,

rates as encompassing the "terms, conditions and other provisions which affect rates," which included limitations on
20

liability.
C.

The Effect of Tariffs

Once a tariff was properly filed and accepted by the Board,
it constituted the contract of carriage between the airline and
its shippers and passengers, and conclusively governed the
rights and liabilities of the parties. 27 A tariff operated to limit
the air carrier's liability even if the shipper or passenger had
Is 49 U.S.C. § 1324 (1976)(amended 1978).
'9 Id. § 1371(a).
Id. § 1373.
Id. § 1482.

Id.
Id.
24

§ 1482(g).

See 14 C.F.R. § 221 (1982).

s' See 49 U.S.C. § 1373 (1976)(amended 1978).
"

14 C.F.R. § 221.38(a)(2) (1982).

Lichten v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 189 F.2d 939 (2d Cir. 1951); Mao v. Eastern
Airlines, Inc., 310 F. Supp. 844 (S.D.N.Y. 1970). For a general discussion of the effect
of tariffs on air carrier liability, see Pratt, Tariff Limitations on Air Carriage Contracts, 25 J. AIR L. & CoM. 1 (1963) and Rhyne, supra note 12.
27
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no actual knowledge of the tariff's contents, 8 although the
carrier's contract of carriage typically incorporated the tariff
by reference. Courts sometimes gave tariffs an even greater effect and interpreted the tariffs as law, because the tariffs were
required by law to be filed.2 9 The tariff system resulted in
most courts applying tariffs instead of conflicting common law
principles, even though the Act specifically disavowed limiting
any common law remedies."
Most courts followed the doctrine of primary jurisdiction to
refuse to question the reasonableness of tariffs approved by
the Board. The doctrine of primary jurisdiction requires that
provisions of a tariff properly filed with an administrative
body and within its authority be deemed valid until rejected
by that body.3 1 This doctrine was first adopted with respect to
the Board in Lichten v. Eastern Airlines.32 In Lichten, a passenger checked several bags containing valuables with an airline and one of the passenger's bags was mistakenly carried to
another city and misdelivered to an unknown person.3" The
passenger later recovered the bag, but found that several
items of jewelry were missing. At trial, the defendant airline
denied liability, relying on its tariff which provided that jewelry would be carried at the risk of the passenger.
In upholding the limitation imposed by the tariff, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals reasoned that the primary purpose of the Act was to assure uniformity of rates and services. 3" This purpose could only be effected if the Board,
rather than numerous divergent state and federal courts, had
primary jurisdiction to interpret the reasonableness of air car28 Robert v. Pan American World Airways, 71 Misc. 2d 991, 337 N.Y.S.2d 891
(App. Term 1972), aff'd, 42 A.D.2d 929, 347 N.Y.S.2d 1001 (1973).
" Blair v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 244 F. Supp. 369 (S.D. Fla. 1972), aff'd, 477 F.2d
564 (5th Cir. 1973); Valentine v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 144 N.J. Super. 305, 365 A.2d
475 (1976).
8o "Nothing contained in this Act shall in any way abridge or alter the remedies
now existing at common law or by statute, but the provisions of this Act are in addition to such remedies." 49 U.S.C. § 1506 (1976).
", Lichten v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 189 F.2d 939 (2d Cir. 1951).
:2 189 F.2d 939 (2d Cir. 1951).
33 Id. at 940.
Id. at 941.
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rier rates and practices.8 5 Accordingly, the court held that the
regulatory scheme, rather than the common law, governed the
rights of the parties in the case. 6 Later courts have justified
the primary jurisdiction doctrine as efficiently allowing an administrative agency to make an initial determination of legal
37
issues that are particularly within that agency's expertise.
Courts following Lichten upheld tariffs that clearly
abridged common law rights under the doctrine of primary jurisdiction. Air carriers' tariffs commonly limited their liability
with the use of "released rates," which preset a dollar amount
of liability per pound of cargo or baggage shipped. These tariffs provided that the shipper or passenger who desired extra
protection against a potential loss must declare a higher value
and pay a higher rate. 8
Frequently the shipper or passenger was not aware of the
limitations and inadvertently failed to declare the higher
value and pay the excess rate. For example, in Schiff v. Emery
Air Freight Corp., 9 a scientist shipped test tubes of chemicals
worth $30,000 to be used for research. The air carrier was expressly told that the container of test tubes must be shipped
frozen to prevent damage to its contents. The carrier initially
placed a label so designating on the container, but later negligently covered it with other labels. As a result, the test tubes
were stored with other non-frozen materials and their contents deteriorated. The air carrier's tariff limited its liability
to fifty cents per pound of cargo and the court upheld this
limitation even though the shipper had no actual notice of the
limitation. 0 Other courts similarly and consistently upheld
such limitations4 ' and some courts even stated that the shipId.
Is
IId.

Nader v. Allegheny Airlines, Inc., 426 U.S. 290, 304-05 (1976); Far East Conference v. United States, 342 U.S. 570, 574-75 (1952).
88 See, e.g., Blair v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 344 F. Supp. 360, 363 (S.D. Fla. 1972), in
which the tariff declared in part: "A shipment shall have declared value of $0.50 per
pound (but not less than $50.00) unless a higher value is declared on the airbill at the
time of receipt from the shipper . . ."
88 332 F. Supp. 1057 (D. Mass. 1971).
,0 Id. at 1059.
4' See, e.g., Gellert v. United Airlines, 474 F.2d 77 (10th Cir. 1973); Vogelsang v.
'T
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per had a duty to declare a higher value than the tariff
amount to be allowed a higher recovery. 42
Another common tariff limited a carrier's liability for consequential damages 43 resulting from circumstances such as negligence, schedule changes, acts of God and mechanical malfunctions."" This tariff operated to reduce recovery for
consequential damages resulting from delay, including loss of
profits." In Gellert v. United Airlines,"' a shipper brought an
action for delay damages resulting from an air carrier's negligence in failing to deliver clothing samples on time. The samples were to be used in a fashion show and the late arrival
caused the shipper to lose most of its potential orders. The
Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals expressed doubt as to whether
a carrier could completely exculpate itself from consequential
damages, because a carrier cannot totally exempt itself from
its own negligence.41 The court enforced a five hundred dollar
limitation on such damages, however, for it was not a complete exculpation of the carrier's negligence.4 8
Tariff provisions often required that a shipper or passenger
Delta Air Lines, Inc., 302 F.2d 709 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 826 (1962); Blair v.
Delta Air Lines, Inc., 344 F. Supp. 360 (S.D. Fla. 1972); Van Steinberg v. Pacific
Southwest Airlines, 15 Av. Cas. 18,060 (Cal. Ct. App. 1980); Delta Air Lines, Inc., v.
Issacs, 141 Ga. App. 209, 233 S.E.2d 212 (1977); Rosenschein v. Trans World Airlines,
Inc., 349 S.W.2d 483 (Mo. Ct. App. 1961).
"' Vogelsang v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 193 F. Supp. 613 (E.D.N.Y. 1961), aff'd, 302
F.2d 709 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 826 (1962); Eastern Airlines v. Williamson,
282 Ala. 421, 211 So. 2d 912, 915 (1968).
4
Consequential damages are those damages that do not directly and immediately
flow from the act of a party, but rather flow from the results of such act. See 5 A.
CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 1011 (2d ed. 1964).
44 See C.A.B. Order No. 77-3-61 (Mar. 10, 1977); C.A.B. Order No. 76-3-139 (Mar.
22, 1976).
45 See, e.g., Gellert v. United Airlines, 474 F.2d 77 (10th Cir. 1973); Bruce Glen,
Inc. v. Emery Air Freight Corp., 24 A.D.2d 145, 264 N.Y.S.2d 876 (1965); Tannenbaum v. National Airlines, Inc., 13 Misc. 2d 450, 176 N.Y.S.2d 400 (App. Term 1958);
Adest v. Trans Carribbean Airways, Inc., 8 Av. Cas. 17,417 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1963).
4
474 F.2d 77 (10th Cir. 1973).
41 Id.
at 80. See also infra notes 135-41 and accompanying text.
46 474 F.2d at 86. The Board later conducted an investigation and declared certain
tariffs limiting the consequential damages of cargo carriers unlawful. C.A.B. Order
No. 77-3-61 (Mar. 10, 1977). Before this order could be implemented, the Board lost
its power to invalidate tariff provisions upon the passage of the Air Cargo Deregulation Act. See infra notes 100-08 and accompanying text.
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give notice to the air carrier or commence suit within a certain
time as a condition precedent to recovery. Such limitations
sometimes imposed very short notice requirements and have
been consistently upheld in cargo and baggage cases. 4 9" These
limitations were effective even if the air carrier had actual
knowledge of the loss. 50 Courts justified these notice provisions on the basis that they allowed the carrier to quickly investigate and verify claims.8 1
Some air carriers developed complicated notice procedures
that even a reasonably diligent shipper or passenger could
misinterpret. In Nylen v. Delta Air Lines, Inc.,5 2 a passenger
immediately notified a carrier upon the loss of his baggage.
The air carrier's employee gave the passenger a form, which
the passenger filled out and returned. When the passenger attempted to seek reimbursement several months later, he
found that the tariff required that he take a second procedural step and send a written notice of claim to the main office
within forty-five days of the loss. The Massachusetts District
Court held that the first notice constituted only a request for
assistance and did not operate as notice to the airline within
the meaning of the tariff."3 The court justified the airline's requirement of two notices to perfect a claim as having a rational basis in easing the administrative cost of a nationwide
claim procedure."
Some courts have given less effect to tariffs, interpreting
them as merely a contract between the carrier and shipper
and therefore have excused the shipper from compliance with
19 See, e.g., Alco-Gravure Div. of Publications Corp. v. American Airlines, Inc., 173
F. Supp. 752 (D. Md. 1959); Lyons v. American Airlines, Inc., 12 Av. Cas. 17,807 (D.C.
Super. Ct. 1973); Life Sciences, Inc. v. Emery Air Freight Corp., 341 So.2d 272 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1977). A C.A.B. rule prohibits carriers from filing tariffs that would
limit a passenger's ability to recover damages for personal injuries. See infra note
170.
" Scheinman v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 66 Misc. 2d 44, 318 N.Y.S.2d 992 (Civ. Ct.
1971).
6' Robert v. Pan American World Airways, 71 Misc. 2d 991, 337 N.Y.S.2d 891-92
(App. Term 1972), afl'd, 42 A.D.2d 929, 347 N.Y.S. 2d 1001 (1973).
:3 14 Av. Cas. 17,927 (Mass. Dist. Ct. 1977).
3 Id. at 17,930-31.
" Id. at 17,931.
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the tariff limitation when the carrier "fundamentally
breached" the contract for carriage.5 5 In Informational Control Corp. v. United Airlines,56 a shipper carefully chose a
specific air carrier and route to ship electronic equipment.
The shipper chose the shortest nonstop route because of his
experience with the incidental damage caused by loading and
unloading. In contravention to the shipping contract, the carrier rerouted the shipment and the additional handling resulted in damage to the cargo. The California Court of Appeals refused to enforce the liability limitation in the tariff on
the ground that the carrier's deviation from its contractual
performance was so great as to completely change the risk and
the terms of the contract. 7
A few courts have refused to apply the primary jurisdiction
doctrine to defer to the Board's determination of the reasonableness of tariff rules.58 Odam v.Pacific Northern Airlines,
Inc.,59 for example, involved property lost in a plane crash
that had been carried on board by the passenger. The tariff
exempted the airline from damage to unchecked baggage and
personal effects. The Alaska Supreme Court refused to enforce the tariff limitation, taking a narrow view of the primary
jurisdiction doctrine.10 In the court's opinion, the doctrine required deferral to the Board only when the subject matter was
within the Board's special expertise." The court ruled that
the tariff in question did not require the Board's expertise, so
" See, e.g., Information Control Corp. v. United Airlines, 73 Cal. App. 3d 630, 140
Cal. Rptr. 877 (1977); Philco Corp. v. Flying Tiger Line, Inc., 18 Mich. App. 206, 171
N.W.2d 16 (1969) (electronics equipment damaged when shipped on side). But cf.
Schift v. Emery Air Freight Corp., 332 F. Supp. 1057 (D. Mass. 1971) (ordinary negligence in failing to ship test tubes frozen as requested did not result in a fundamental
breach).
" 73 Cal. App. 3d 630, 140 Cal. Rptr. 877 (1977).
17 Id.
at 639, 140 Cal. Rptr. at 882.
" Klicker v. Northwest Airlines, 563 F.2d 1310 (9th Cir. 1977); Odam v. Pacific
Northwest Airlines, Inc., 393 P.2d 112 (Alaska 1964). See also Ravreby v. United
Airlines, Inc., 293 N.W.2d 260 (Iowa 1980) (holding that the primary jurisdiction doctrine does not apply when a specific regulatory issue has been considered previously
by the agency).
n 393 P.2d 112 (Alaska 1964).
Id. at 115-16.
I0
61Id.
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the court proceeded to make an independent determination of
the tariff's reasonableness."'
Thus, under the Act, Congress set up an extensive administrative structure that governed, among other things, the liabilities of air carriers. Air carriers were required to file tariffs
with the Board, which once accepted as reasonable by the
Board, preempted the common law rules in most courts.
III.

DEREGULATION

A.

Statutory Changes
In 1977 and 1978, Congress radically changed the entire
structure of the air transportation industry by enacting the
Airline Deregulation Act 3 and the Air Cargo Deregulation
Act.' The Airline Deregulation Act governs all interstate air
carriers and is designed to establish a system in which competitive market forces will determine the quality, variety, and
price of air service.15 The furthest reaching aspect of the Airline Deregulation Act is its so-called "sunset provisions,"
which provide that the Board will cease to exist on January 1,
1985. 66 At that time the Board's duties either will have been
terminated or will have been transfered to other federal agencies.6 The Board's authority to govern the rates and practices
of air carriers and the statutory requirement that the carriers
file tariffs ends on January 1, 1983."8
To facilitate the deregulation process, Congress substan62
"
"
*'

Id. at 116.
Pub. L. No. 95-504, 92 Stat. 1705-54 (1978) (codified at 49 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1552).
Pub. L. No. 95-163, 91 Stat. 1278-89 (1977) (codified at 49 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1552).
49 U.S.C. § 1302 (Supp. IV 1980).
49 U.S.C. § 1551 (Supp. IV 1980). By January 1, 1984, the Board will submit a
comprehensive report to Congress along with an opinion concerning whether the public interest requires continuation of the Board. Id. § 1551(c) & (d).

17 Id. § 1551(b). The Department of Justice will obtain the Board's authority to
supervise mergers. The Department of Transportation will insure essential air trans-

portation to small communities and assume authority over foreign air transportaion
(with consultation with the Department of State). The Postal Service will obtain the
Board's authority over the carriage of mail by air. Id. § 1551(b)(1).
" Id. § 1551(a)(2). The Board will retain some authority between 1983 and 1985,
including the power to provide compensation for air transportation to small commu-

nities and to regulate foreign air transportation. Id.
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tially broadened the Board's authority to grant exemptions to
certain classes of air carriers from the requirements of complying with the Act.69 Prior to the adoption of the Airline Deregulation Act, the Board could grant exemptions only upon a
finding of an "undue burden" upon a carrier by virtue of the
limited extent of its operations or the existence of unusual circumstances affecting the carrier's operations.7 0 As a result of
the Airline Deregulation Act, the Board may exempt any person from complying with tariffs upon a finding that "the exemption is consistent with the public interest."' 7 Congress ex-

panded the exemption power to allow the Board to relieve
classes of carriers from the statutory provisions in situations
where their observance would produce anomolous or inconsistent results.
The Air Cargo Deregulation Act immediately and substantially deregulated all-cargo carriers.7 3 The Act had empowered
the Board to investigate and invalidate airline rates and practices that were in the Board's opinion unjust or unreasonable
or unjustly discriminatory, unduly preferential, or prejudicial
or predatory. 4 Under this provision, the Board regulated
cargo carrier's attempts at limiting their liability. The Air
Cargo Deregulation Act terminated the Board's express authority to invalidate the tariffs of cargo carriers the Board
deemed "unjust or unreasonable," although the Board continues to regulate discriminatory, preferential, prejudicial or
predatory practices by all-cargo carriers.7 5 The deregulation
69 Id. § 1386.
70 49 U.S.C. § 1386 (1976)(amended 1978). The Board in 1952, for example, exempted small and irregular carriers, designated "air taxis," from the certification requirement. 14 C.F.R. § 298.3 (1982).
" 49 U.S.C. § 1386(b)(1) (Supp. IV 1980).
72 REPORT OF THE SENATE COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE, SCIENCE AND TRANSPORTATION,

S. REP. No. 631, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 85-86 (1978) [hereinafter cited as REPORT). The
Board initally used its expanded exemption power to allow passenger carriers to settle disputes with customers, even if settlements would violate the applicable tariff.
C.A.B. Order No. 78-12-49 (Dec. 2, 1978). Some airlines had previously represented to
customers that they could not settle disputes in contravention of the tariff limitations, even if they so desired, without incurring criminal penalties. Id. at 2.
73 See C.A.B. Order No. 78-12-49 (Dec. 2, 1978).
74 49 U.S.C. § 1482(d) (1976)(amended 1978).
75 Id. § 1482(d)(3).
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acts therefore require that the Board treat all-cargo carriers
and passenger carriers differently; all-cargo carriers' practices
may be invalidated only if discriminatory, preferential, prejudicial or predatory, while the practices of commercial passenger carriers may still be invalidated under a broader unjust or
76
unreasonable standard.

B. Reasons For Deregulation
A Congressional change in attitude towards regulation was
the impetus for the statutory amendments. Congress shifted
from its previous view favoring regulation to its present view
that market forces should govern the rates and practices of air
carriers. The policy statement of the original Federal Aviation
Act illustrates the attitude of Congress toward regulation in
the 1930's." The Federal Aviation Act then stressed the pro-

motion of "efficient service by air carriers at reasonable
charges without unjust discriminations, undue preferences or
advantages, or unfair or destructive competitive practices.7 8
The policy statements of the current deregulation acts illustrate Congress' changed attitude. The Airline Deregulation
Act emphasizes placing "maximum reliance on competitive
market forces and on actual and potential competition.

. .

to

encourage efficient and well managed carriers to earn adequate profits and to attract capital. 7' 9 The Air Cargo Deregulation Act favors competition to an even greater degree, for it
mandates that the Board rely solely "upon competitive market forces to determine the extent, variety, quality and price
of [air] services."80
76

Id. § 1482(1) & (3).

77

For a general discussion of the background of aviation regulation, see A.

LOWENFELD, AVIATION LAW, ch. 1 (2d ed. 1981).
78 49 U.S.C. § 130 2 (c) (1976)(amended 1978) (emphasis added).
79 49 U.S.C. § 1302(a)(4) (Supp. IV 1980).

Id. § 1302(b)(2). The legislative history of the Air Cargo Deregulation Act illustrates this point:
Historically, as all-cargo air transportation expanded, it had to adapt
itself to the regulatory environment rather than adapt to the demands
of the marketplace. This antithetical approach to all-cargo transportation has lead to unjustified discrimination against cargo carriers. ...
The only standards that are necessary for rate regulation are the re-
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Several interrelated factors influenced Congress' decision to
curtail the regulatory structure.81 First, Congress recognized a
growing public resentment against public regulation of all
kinds. s2 This attitude is in sharp contrast to the public perception of government regulation in the 1930's as a cure for all
economic evils.83 Second, Congress and the public viewed the
outstanding performance of intrastate air carriers, which are
beyond the control of most federal regulation, as proof that
safe and efficient service is possible without extensive regulation.8 4 Finally, many legislators believed that the Board's regulations caused high fares and technical inefficiency.85 In particular, inefficient routes and Board-imposed regulations were
seen as increasing the costs of for all other routes.88
Neither the Congressional policies in the Airline Deregulation Act nor the factors influencing deregulation indicate that
Congress specifically considered the effect that deregulation
would have on liability limitation rules.8 7 The overall purpose
of the two deregulation acts is to allow market forces to govern the rates and practices of air carriers. 8 While the liability
straints that in setting rates, discrimination, preferences, and predatory pricing can be watchdogged. The market forces can adequately
determine the cost of all-cargo transportation.
123 CONG. REC. § 34,663 (daily ed. Oct. 20, 1977) (remarks of Sen. Cannon).
See generally Kelleher, supra note 14, at 274-78.
82 A. LOWENFELD, supra note 77, ch. 4, § 1.1; Kelleher, supra note 14, at 274.
83 See generally Redford, The Significance of Belief Patternsin Economic Regulations: The Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938, 14 W. POL. Q. 13 (1961).
" A. LOWENFELD, supra note 77, ch. 4, § 1.1; Kelleher, supra note 14, at 274-75.
" See REPORT, supra note 72, at 5, which states that "air transportation will be
more likely to expand if the heavy hand of C.A.B. regulation is removed from the
creative hand of carrier management."
88 In senate hearings on various versions of the Cargo Deregulation Act, Senator
Kennedy testified that:
[Tihe fact is that current regulation brings about its own peculiar form
of wasteful competition, and it exacts a fearsome cost ... The airlines
channel their competitive energies into costlier service and chase the
travel dollars with frills and lavish scheduling which sends planes off
across the country half 'empty ... It explains why airline prices can be
too high at the very same time airline profits are too low.
Hearings on S. 296 and S. 689 before the Senate Subcommittee on Aviation of the
Committee on Commerce, Science and Transportation,95th Congress, 1st Sess., pt.
1, at 101 (1977).
8, See 49 U.S.C. § 1302 (1978 & Supp. IV 1980).
" See supra notes 79-80.
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limitations that a carrier adopts in its tickets or bills of lading
have been interpreted to be part of these rates and practices,
it is doubtful that many shippers or passengers even notice
these provisions, much less consider them in choosing an air
carrier. Liability limitations usually are noticed only upon an
actual loss. 9

Even if Congress did not consider the impact of deregulation on liability limitations in tariffs, tariffs as a whole are as
likely a target for deregulation as any other anti-competitive
airline practice. Tariffs originally served several purposes.
First, they provided information to be used by the government as a tool to enforce the regulatory policy of controlling
competition. Second, tariffs potentially provided shippers
and passengers with notice of the terms and conditions of carriage and thus promoted the statutory policy of providing uniform service.9 1 Third,
tariffs allowed carriers to predict and
2
limit their liability.
The first two reasons for tariffs are not as compelling as
they once were. First, with the change in the regulatory policies, the Board no longer uses its power to suspend tariffs as a
check on competition."s The second rationale for tariffs is also
doubtful because passengers and shippers seldom examine
tariffs despite their legal right to do so. 4 Even if passengers
chose to read tariffs, they are too complicated for much practical use." Thus, even the Board has recognized that tariffs
"have merely become a defense for carriers who were faced
with litigation.' 6
C. Confusion in the Transition to a Free Market
Passenger airlines and all-cargo airlines were treated differ" See Elimination of Rules Tariffs Notice to Passengers of Conditions of Carriage,
46 Fed. Reg. 35,936 (1981).
o Id.
e1

Id.

"Id.
"
Id. at 35,937.
IId.

See C.A.B. Order No. 79-2-106, at 3 (Feb. 15, 1979).
Elimination of Rules Tariffs Notice to Passengers of Conditions of Carriage, 46
Fed. Reg. 35,936, 35,937 (1981).
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ently under the deregulation acts. All airlines were required to
file tariffs, but the Board had the power to reject only the tar97
iffs of passenger carriers that were unjust and unreasonable.
Some shippers feared that this would allow cargo carriers to
file unreasonable liability limitations in their tariffs that
would be upheld by courts under the stare decisis of the previous primary jurisdiction cases" which were decided when
the Board had broader powers to reject unreasonable
practices. 9
This issue concerning the stare decisis of the primary jurisdiction cases after deregulation arose in a 1978 Order that examined the Board's power over air cargo carrier's liability limitation practices after the passage of the Air Cargo
Deregulation Act. 10 0 The Order involved a pre-deregulation
investigation"° in which the Board found that certain liability
limitations used by cargo carriers were unjust and unreasonable 0 2 and structured new tariffs in their place. The investigation results were vacated by a Court of Appeals in light of the
Air Cargo Deregulation Act and remanded to the Board for a
finding of its jurisdiction. 0 3 The Board found that the Air
Cargo Deregulation Act had ended its power to find cargo liability limitations unjust and unreasonable under the Federal
Aviation Act. 0 4 On the issue of primary jurisdiction, the
Board rejected the shipper's contention that courts would
See supra note 76 and accompanying text.
See Lichten v. Eastern Airlines, 189 F.2d 939 (2d Cir. 1951), discussed supra at
notes 31-36 and accompanying text.
97
9

" See Liability and Claims Rules and Practices Investigation, C.A.B. Order 78-7100 (July 21, 1978).
,00 Id. at 7.
10, Id. at 1.
102 The tariffs exempted carriers from liability for consequential damages and limited their other liability to fifty cents per pound. Id.
I American Airlines, Inc. v. C.A.B., Nos. 77-1415, 77-1452 (D.C. Cir., filed May 13,
1977). See discussion in Shippers Nat'l Freight Claim Council, Inc. v. United Airlines,
Inc., 15 Av. Cas. 17,439 (D.D.C. 1978).
104 The shippers had argued that although Congress ended the Board's
express authority to find rates and practices unreasonable, Congress had only intended to deregulate rates and had no intention to have liability limitations governed by market
forces. The Board disagreed, holding that the legislative history did not indicate that
Congress intended to treat liability limitations differently than rates. C.A.B. Order
No. 78-7-100, at 3 (July 21, 1978).
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continue to defer to the Board on the reasonableness of tariff
rules, stating that:
Since Congress has eliminated our responsibility for
supervising the reasonableness of interstate cargo rates and
services, we believe that the courts will recognize that
Lichten's reasoning is no longer applicable. Accordingly, we
would expect the courts to apply the rules of contract and
tort law to interstate cargo carriers, irrespective of their tariff
rules on file with the Board."'5
Having failed to convince the Board to overturn the tariff
rules, the shippers took their case back to court. A district
court in Shipper's National Freight Claim Council, Inc. v.
United Air Lines, Inc.1" agreed that the Air Cargo Deregulation Act ended the Board's power over the reasonableness of
rates and practices, but refused to apply a standard of reasonableness to the practices under its own powers, noting that
Congress intended for market forces to govern the reasonableness of tariffs.1 07 The court stated in dicta, however, that "it
may well be that a plaintiff could challenge the tariff rules as
terms in his contract of carriage in a contract action for damages or other relief on grounds of illegality or unconscionability."10 8
In response to the confusion over the purpose and use of
tariffs after deregulation,10 9 the Board proceeded to exempt
cargo carriers from the requirement of filing tariffs 10 under
the Board's expanded authority to grant exemptions to air
carriers under the Airline Deregulation Act."' Various air carriers challenged the Board's exemption in court as an abuse of
discretion, relying on the refusal of Congress to abolish tariff

'"

Id. at 7.
15 Av. Cas. 17,439 (D.D.C. 1978).

107 "In view of this unambiguous legislative purpose, there simply is no merit to the
proposition that any standard of reasonableness of cargo rates should be enforced,
whether by the Civil Aeronautics Board, or the several U.S. District Courts." Id. at
17,440.
o Id. at 17,441.
See National Small Shipments Traffic Conference, Inc. v. C.A.B., 618 F.2d 819,
824 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
110 14 C.F.R. § 291.31 (1982).
" 49 U.S.C. § 1386 (Supp. IV 1980).
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filing requirements. 1 2 A federal district court in National
Small Shipment Traffic Conference, Inc. v. C.A.B.'" upheld
the Board's exemption, finding that Congress had substantially broadened the Board's authority so that it could grant
an exemption merely upon a finding that it "is consistent with
the public interest to do so."" " The court stated that while
tariffs still served a useful purpose in disseminating information to the public, the Board acted reasonably in its determination that the policies of the Air Cargo Deregulation Act
would be better served without the tariff filing requirement.1 16
The court also recognized that the total deregulation of air
cargo carriers would provide Congress with an example of operations in a totally deregulated air industry.1 6 Subsequently,
the Board issued an interpretive rule exempting air passenger
carriers from the tariff filing requirement beginning in 1983.117

IV.

RETURN TO COMMON LAW

A.

Generally
As the preceding section indicates, Congress has mandated
that air cargo liability limitations now be treated by common
law rules. Passenger carriers are still governed by the Board's
primary jurisdiction, although this will change in 1983 when
all tariff requirements are abolished." 8 The deregulation of liability limitation rules requires a reinterpretation of common
law liability." 9 The present state of the law is unclear, for all
interstate common carriers have been regulated for most of
this century. 2 0 Air carriers are Congress' first experiment in
...See National Small Shipments Traffic Conference, Inc. v. C.A.B., 618 F.2d 819
(D.C. Cir. 1980).

ld.
I1'

" ld. at 825.
"'

Id.

11

Id.

at 826.

"'
Tarriffs for Post-1982 Domestic Travel, 47 Fed. Reg. 14,892 (1982) (to be codified at 14 C.F.R. § 399.40 (1982)).
11eSee supra note 117 and accompanying text.
"'
For a discussion of the state of the law before the Civil Aeronautics Act, see
Pratt, supra note 27; Rittenberg, supra note 10.
"o The Interstate Commerce Act, 49 U.S.C. § 20(11) (1976), has regulated the lia-
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deregulation of liability limitations and courts today probably
will not treat liability limitations in exactly the same manner
as they did fifty years ago.
The tariff system under the regulatory scheme required that
all carriers file their rates and practices, including liability
limitations, with the Board. 2 ' Although most courts enforced
these limitations as a matter of law even when shippers or
passengers had no notice of their existence,' 2 2 air carriers usually inserted a clause in the passenger's ticket or the bill of
lading 23 incorporating the tariff provisions by reference. With
the demise of the tariff system, air carriers will be forced to
list or incorporate by reference the practices previously set
forth in their tariffs. Bills of lading have always been complex,
but passenger tickets are likely to become much more detailed
in the future as a result of deregulation.
Standard of Care of Common Carriers
1. Personal Injuries. Common carriers owe their passengers
a high duty of care and must use great caution to protect passengers entrusted into their custody.' 2' This high duty of care
is justified by the fact that "there is no [other] mode of transportation where the passenger's safety is so completely entrusted to the care and skill of the carrier. "125 The carrier is
not, however, an insurer of the passenger's absolute safety. LiB.

bility of most common carriers, including motor carriers, freight forwarders, railroads
and express companies since 1906. Water carriers' liability for property damage and
personal injuries is governed by 46 U.S.C. §§ 183-94 (1976). The Warsaw Convention,
supra note 6, regulates the liability of air carriers in international transportation.
49 U.S.C. § 1373 (1976)(amended 1978).
" See supra notes 27-54 and accompanying text.
IS A bill of lading, also known as an air bill or air waybill when used in air carriage, is a document describing the freight to be shipped and contains the entire contract upon which the responsibilities and liabilities of the carrier, connecting carrier,
consignee and shipper rest. E.I. DuPont de Nemours v. Schenkes Int'l Forwarders,
Inc., 12 Av. Cas. 18,360 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1974). The bill of lading is also a document of
title to the goods. Southern Ry. v. Prescott, 240 U.S. 632 (1916). It serves as evidence
of the receipt and condition of goods. Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co. v. Central Iron
& Coal Co., 265 U.S. 59, 67 (1924). The Federal Bill of Lading Act (Pomerene Act),
49 U.S.C. §§ 81-124 (1976), requires bills of lading to be paid to the bearer of negotiable instruments when they are issued by a carrier in interstate commerce.
124 W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 334, at 181 (4th ed. 1971).
" Smith v. O'Donnell, 215 Cal. 714, 12 P.2d 933, 935 (1932).
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ability, therefore, must be based upon the negligence of the
carrier. ' In addition, courts commonly apply the doctrine of
27
res ipsa loquitur1
to airplane accidents to shift the burden
of proof to the carrier so that it must disprove that the accident was its fault."" The effect of the presumption under res
ipsa loquitor doctrine lessens the plaintiff's difficulty in prov12 9
ing that an airline has breached its duty of care.
2. Property Damage. The common law also imposes a high
duty of care upon the common carrier receiving goods for
transportation. The common carrier is liable as an insurer, unless the loss is caused by established exceptions.3' An injured
plaintiff establishes a prima facie case by showing that the
goods were delivered to the carrier in good condition but arrived at their destination in damaged condition.'
Proof of
the prima facie case results in a conclusive presumption of
negligence,3 2 unless the loss was caused by an act of God, the
public enemy, seizure by law, inherent vice, or the fault of the
shipper. 33 The burden of persuasion for proving that an ex32s Arrow Aviation, Inc. v. Moore, 266 F.2d 488 (8th Cir. 1959); Ness
v. West Coast
Airlines, Inc., 90 Idaho 111, 410 P.2d 965 (1965); Cudney v. Midcontinental Airlines,
Inc., 303 Mo. 922, 254 S.W.2d 612 (1953); Crowell v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 240 N.C.
80, 81 S.E.2d 178 (1954).
1"
Res ipsa loquitor is a rule of evidence whereby the negligence of an alleged
wrongdoer may be inferred from the mere fact that the accident happened provided
that the character of the accident and the circumstances surrounding it lead reasonably to the belief that in the absence of negligence it would not have occurred and the
instrument which caused injury is shown to have been in the exclusive control of the
alleged wrongdoer. Cox v. Northeast Airlines, Inc., 379 F.2d 893, 894-5 (7th Cir.
1967).
128 Id. See also Smith v. Pacific Alaska Airways, Inc., 89 F.2d 253 (9th Cir. 1937);
Smith v. O'Donnell, 215 Cal. 714, 12 P.2d 933 (1932); Robert v. Trans World Airlines,
225 Cal. App. 2d 344, 37 Cal. Rptr. 291 (1964). But see, Jackson v. Stancil, 253 N.C.
291, 116 S.E.2d 817 (1960); Woodall Flying Service, Inc. v. Thomas, 27 N.C. App. 171,
218 S.E.2d 203 (1975).
"9 See, e.g., Cox v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 379 F.2d 893, 895 (7th Cir. 1967).
:30 W. PROSSER, supra note 124, § 34, at 180.
,' Missouri Pac. R.R. Co. v. Elmore & Stahl, 377 U.S. 134, 138 (1964); Delta Airlines, Inc. v. Isaacs, 141 Ga. App. 209, 233 S.E.2d 212, 213 (1977); Travelers Ins. Co. v.
Delta Airlines, Inc., 498 S.W.2d 443, 446-47 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1973, no
writ). See generally S. SORKIN, How To RECOVER FOR Loss OR DAMAGE TO GOODS IN
TRANSIT, ch. 5 (1976 & Supp. 1982).
,' Missouri Pac. R.R. Co. v. Elmore & Stahl, 377 U.S. 134 (1964).
'"
S. WILLISTON, WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS §§ 1103-08 (3d ed. 1967).
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cepted peril caused the damage rests on the carrier,"" resulting in an effect not unlike res ipsa loquitor.
C.

Limitations on Recovery for Property Damage

Common carriers attempted very early to relieve themselves
of the effect of their common law duty by limiting their liability in their contracts of carriage. Courts traditionally have
been hostile to some limitations and the common law developed a rule that no contract could exempt a common carrier
from liability for its own negligence. 135 In an early case, New
York Central Railroad Co. v. Lockwood,'3 6 a drover"3 7 was injured while traveling with his cattle under a contract that exempted the carrier for all liability for the carrier's negligence.
The Supreme Court refused to enforce the limitation, holding
that a common carrier cannot exempt itself from the negligence of itself or its servants.3' Courts have viewed such a
limitation as an attempt by the carrier to put off the essential
duties of its employment.13 9
This rule rejecting limitations on liability has been justified
on two grounds in property cases. First, it induces carriers to
use sufficient care and watchfulness in protecting goods
shipped. 14 0 Second, courts have recognized that the carrier
"' Missouri Pac. R.R. Co. v. Elmore & Stahl, 377 U.S. 134 (1964); Loop Cold Storage Co. v. South Tex. Packers, Inc., 483 S.W.2d 914, 918 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus
Christi 1972), rev'd on other grounds, 491 S.W.2d 106 (Tex. 1973).
'35 PROSSER, supra note 124, § 68, at 443.
1"6 84 U.S. 357 (1873).
187 A

drover drives a herd of cattle from the ranch to market.

Il Id. at 378. See also Inman v. South Carolina Ry. Co., 129 U.S. 128 (1889).
'39 New York, N.H. & H. R.R. Co. v. Nothnagle, 346 U.S. 128, 136 (1953) (quoting
Santa Fe, P. & P. Ry. Co. v. Grant Bros. Const. Co., 228 U.S. 177, 184-85 (1913)).
140 The Supreme Court in one case stated that:
The foundation of the rule is, that it tends to the greater security of

consignors, who always deal with such carriers at a disadvantage. It
tends to induce greater care and watchfulness in those to whom an
owner entrusts his goods, and by whom alone the needful care can be
exercised. Any contract that withdraws a motive for such care, or that

makes a failure to bestow upon the duty assumed extreme vigilance
and caution more probable, takes away the security of the consignors
and makes common carriage more unreliable.
Bank of Kentucky v. Adams Express Co., 93 U.S. 174, 183 (1876). See also Russell v.
Pittsburgh, C.C. & St. L. Ry. Co., 157 Ind. 305, 61 N.E. 678 (1901); Smith v. New
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and the individual shipper are not on equal footing and that
"[tihe latter cannot afford to h[a]ggle or stand out and seek
141
redress in the courts.
The Supreme Court modified this strict rule with respect to
property damage in the case Hart v. Pennsylvania Railroad
Co., 142 in which the Court allowed a carrier to limit its liability
with a "released rate" clause. 143 Such a clause limits a carrier's
liability to a preset amount, which the shipper may only increase by paying an increased rate. In Hart, a shipper transported horses pursuant to a bill of lading that limited the
value of the horses to two hundred dollars apiece. Two horses,
which the shipper later claimed to be race horses worth
144
$15,000, were killed as a result of the railroad's negligence.
The Court upheld the limitation, reasoning that the limitation
on liability did not induce want of care as would a total exemption, because the limitation exacted from the carrier a
measure of care equal to the value agreed upon. by the parties.1 45 The Court did not worry that the limitation might violate public policy; on the contrary, the Court stated that any
other holding would allow the shipper the windfall of a lower
14 6
contract price for greater protection if there was no loss.
The Court later stressed that only by offering the shipper
the opportunity to choose between released rates could such a
clause withstand judicial scrutiny.14 7 This opportunity was of
little consequence to shippers who did not read their bills of
lading closely, for the courts enforced recitals in the contract
that required the shipper to affirmatively state a higher rate
York, Cent. R.R., 24 N.Y. 222 (1862).
4'Santa Fe P. & P. Ry. Co. v. Grant Bros. Constr. Co., 228 U.S. 177, 185 (1913).
See also New York, N.H. & H. R.R. Co. v. Nothnagle, 346 U.S. 128, 136 (1953); Liverpool & Great W. Steam Co. v. Phoenix Ins. Co., 129 U.S. 397, 441 (1889).
.4.

112 U.S. 331 (1884).

at 343. See also Union Pac. R.R. Co. v. Burke, 255 U.S. 317 (1921).
112 U.S. at 334-37.
,41Id. at 340.
,46Id. at 341. The Court later noted in Adams Express Co. v. Croninger, 226 U.S.
491, 509 (1913) that the carrier "has an inherent right to receive a compensation commensurate with the risk involved."
147 Boston & M. R.R. v. Piper, 246 U.S. 439 (1918).
:43 Id.
'4
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or be bound by one set out by the carrier. 148 The Supreme
Court noted in one case "[t]hat no inquiry was made as to the
actual value is not vital to the fairness of the agreement in
this case."'4 9 Some earlier cases, decided under state law, required the carrier to make a greater effort to give the shipper
actual notice. " These cases, however, were effectively overruled by the Cummins Amendment to the Interstate Commerce Act, which expressly allows a carrier to limit its liability, provided that the limitation is approved by the Interstate
Commerce Commission and the shipper can obtain increased
protection by paying a higher rate.' 5 '
D.

Limitations on Recovery For Personal Injuries

1. Limitations on the Amount of Recovery. As with the
property cases discussed above, " the common law did not allow a common carrier to exempt itself totally from liability for
its own negligence for personal injury to its passengers.' The
policy reasons for encouraging a high standard of care are
even more compelling when personal injury is involved. 154 Unlike the property cases, the common law did not allow a common carrier to limit its liability by offering released rates to
its passengers and rejected such limitations as contrary to
public policy.'55
"0 American R.R. Express Co. v. Lindenberg, 260 U.S. 584 (1923); Wells, Fargo &
Co. v. Neiman-Marcus, Co., 227 U.S. 469 (1913).
"0 Adams Express Co. v. Croninger, 226 U.S. 491, 508 (1913).
1S See, e.g., Hayes v. Adams Express Co., 74 N.J.L. 537, 65 A. 1044 (1907)
(stressing the need for a bona fide agreement as to the value of property to be
shipped in order to bind the shipper to the limitation); Schutte v. Weir, 59 Misc. 438,
111 N.Y.S. 240 (App. Term 1908) (holding that a receipt that had been rubber
stamped "[v]alue asked for and not given ... " was ineffective to limit the carrier's
liability).
5-' 49 U.S.C. § 20(11) (1976).
181 See supra notes 136-41 and accompanying text.
lB See New York Cent. R.R. Co. v. Lockwood, 84 U.S. 357 (1873). See also supra
notes 136-38 and accompanying text.
' See supra note 125 and accompanying text.
'66Curtiss-Wright Flying Serv. Inc. v. Glose, 66 F.2d 710, 713 (3d Cir. 1933) (holding that "common carriers, in dealing with passengers, cannot compel them to so release their legal liability for their own negligence"); Allison v. Standard Air Lines,
Inc., [1930J U.S. Av. R. 292, 298 (S.D. Cal.), afld, 65 F.2d 668 (9th Cir. 1933) (noting
that "the issuance of a ticket with provision printed thereon such as have been placed
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Conklin v. Canadian-ColonialAirways, Inc."' e involved a
wrongful death suit in which the defendant airline offered released passenger rates printed on the ticket. The passenger
was allowed to choose between $5,000, $10,000 or $15,000 liability limitations, depending upon the amount paid for passage. The New York Court of Appeals invalidated the liability
limitation, relying upon an earlier case that prohibited carriers from totally exempting themselves from liability.1

7

The

passenger's lack of bargaining power also seems to have influenced the court.'15 Limitations on an air carrier's liability for
personal injuries are allowed, however, in international
flights'59 and in some foreign countries.160
in evidence does not change the relation of the parties in this action"); Law v. Transcontinental Air Transport, Inc. [1931] U.S. Av. R. 205, 214 (E.D. Pa.) ("[n]o common
carrier has a right to ask its passengers to relieve it of failure on its part to perform
the duty of care which the law requires of it."); Conklin v. Canadian-Colonial Airways, 286 N.Y. 244, 190 N.E. 692 (1935).
"s 266 N.Y. 244, 194 N.E. 692 (1935).
'17 194 N.E. at 693. The court relied upon New York Cent. R.R. Co. v. Lockwood,
84 U.S. 357 (1873).
1" 194 N.E. at 694. One modern case applied this rule to invalidate a detailed release that exculpated a parachute school from its own negligence when a student was
killed in a fall. In Gross v. Sweet, 49 N.Y.2d 102, 400 N.E.2d 306 (1979), the court
stated: "[Tihe law's reluctance to enforce exculpatory provisions of this nature has
resulted in the development of an exacting standard by which courts measure their
validity." Id. at 309. But see Gold v. Swiss Air Transp. Co., 33 A.D.2d 777, 307 N.Y.S.
2d 832 (1969), which suggests in dicta that a limitation on damages for personal injury might be enforceable if the passenger was given a choice of rates. Id.
1' Article 22 of the Warsaw Convention, supra note 6, limits an international air
carrier's liability for personal injuries to a maximum of 125,000 gold francs (approximately 10,000 U.S. dollars) for each passenger. Air carriers flying to, from, or stopping
in the United States have signed the Montreal Agreement, May 13, 1966, 49 U.S.C. §
1502, note, ICAO Doc. No. 8584-LC/154-1, whereby these carriers increase their potential liability to $75,000. See generally Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn, The United
States and the Warsaw Convention, 80 HARv. L. Rv. 497 (1967); Comment, From
Warsaw to Tenerife: A ChronologicalAnalysis of the Liability Limitations Imposed
Pursuant to the Warsaw Convention, 45 J. AIR L. & CoM. 653 (1980).
"0 English and Canadian cases have allowed carriers to limit their liability for personal injuries so long as the carrier takes reasonable steps to give the passenger notice
of the limitation. See, e.g., Ludditt v. Ginder Coote Airways, Ltd., [1942] 4 D.L.R.
353 (Can.), (holding that "a carrier of passengers can contract out liability which attaches to him"), reprinted in [1942] U.S. Av. R. 178; McKay & Craigie v. Scottish
Airways, Ltd., 1948 Ses. Cas. 254 (Scot.) (holding that clear and unambiguous language will suffice to exclude common law liability), reprintedin [1948] U.S. Av. R. 76;
1 C. SHAWCROSS & M. BEAUMONT, AIR LAW 94-96, 377 (4th ed. 1977)(discussing English law).
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2. Requirements of Notice and Commencement of Suit
Within a Specific Time. Although courts have strictly prohibited carriers from limiting their liability for personal injuries,
they have taken a more lenient position with regard to requirements of notice or commencement of suit within a specific time as a condition to recovery. Such limitations have
been upheld, so long as the time allowed has not been ridiculously short."" The difference in the court's approach to limitations on the amount of personal injury recovery and the
court's approach to limitations on the time to give notice or
file suit on a personal injury claim may in some instances emphasize form over substance, for a short notice or filing requirement may exculpate a carrier to a greater degree than a
similar limitation on damages.
The leading Supreme Court case in this area is Gooch v.
Oregon Short Line Railroad Co.,"6 2 in which a drover's pass'
conditioned liability upon a requirement that the injured
party give notice to the railroad within thirty days of injury.
The Court upheld the notice provision, stating that "a stipulation for written notice within a reasonable time stands on a
different footing" from an exoneration from negligence. 164 The
Court did not hold that all notice requirements would be enforced, noting that "an exception might be implied if the accident made notice within the time impracticable.'

16 5

The

Court justified its holding as providing carriers with some
safeguard against fraud. 6 One court allowed a forty day notice limitation, reasoning that if "claims may be presented at
any time within the term of years permitted by the statute of
limitations, the opportunity for investigation will often be lost
beyond recall.""' At common law, courts also required that
' See, e.g., Oceanic Steam Navigation Co. v. Corcoran, 9 F.2d 724 (2d Cir. 1925)
(holding that a three day notice provision was unreasonable).
142 258 U.S. 22 (1922).
300 A drover's pass is a free pass given by a railroad company, accepting a drove of

cattle for transportation, to the drover who accompanies and cares for the cattle on
the train. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 446 (Rev. 5th ed. 1979).
104

258 U.S. at 24.

d. at 25.
Id.
M Murray v. Cunard S.S. Co., 235 N.Y. 162, 139 N.E. 226, 228 (1923) (Cardozo, J.).
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these conditions be expressly stated on the ticket.'"
Until 1954, air carriers commonly included notice and commencement of suit conditions in their tariffs.169 In that year
the Board promulgated a regulation prohibiting tariff rules
that contained any limitation or condition on an air carrier's
liability for personal injury.1 70 Since that time, such limitations have not been allowed. Before the Board regulation,
however, many air cases involving personal injuries upheld the
validity of these conditions. While some of these cases were
based upon the doctrine of primary jurisdiction,17 1 other cases
upheld these conditions without relying upon the Board's
statutory authority.17 2 In Wilhelmy v. Northwest Airlines,
Inc.,17 3 the plaintiff alleged that an air carrier was negligent in
descending at a too rapid rate, which resulted in injury to the
plaintiff's inner ear and throat. The applicable tariff required
written notice of the claim within thirty days and the commencement of suit within one year of injury. 17 4 The federal
district court held that the plaintiff's failure to comply with
the tariff provisions barred the action.' 7 6 The court rejected
the plaintiff's challenge to the validity of the conditions, find1 ' 76
ing them "reasonable and valid.
Other courts during this period refused to uphold these
108

See The Majestic, 166 U.S. 375, 386 (1897). See infra notes 199-203 and accom-

panying text.

"I' See infra text accompanying note 174.
170

14 C.F.R. 221.38(h) (1982) provides:

No provisions of the Board's regulations issued under this part or elsewhere shall be construed to require on or after March 2, 1954, the
filing of any tariff rules stating any limitation on, or condition relating
to, the carriers's liability for personal injury or death. No subsequent
regulation issued by the Board shall be construed to supersede or
modify this rule of construction except to the extent that such regulation shall do so in express terms.
17 Herman v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 222 F.2d 326 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 350
U.S. 843 (1955); Brandt v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc., [1948] U.S. Av. R. 637 (S.D.N.Y.).
M Wilhelmy v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 86 F. Supp. 565 (W.D. Wash. 1949); Indemnity Ins. Co. of N. Am. v. Pan American Airways, Inc., 58 F. Supp. 338 (S.D.N.Y.
1944); Sheldon v. Pan American Airways, Inc., 190 Misc. 537, 74 N.Y.S.2d 578 (Sup.
Ct.), aff'd, 272 A.D. 1000, 74 N.Y.S.2d 267 (1947).
17186 F. Supp. 565 (W.D. Wash. 1949).
174Id. at 566.
175Id.
176 Id.
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conditions. 17 7 These cases all accepted Gooch 171 as controlling

to allow some limitations, but objected that the tariff did not
give adequate notice to the passengers. In Shortley v. Northwestern Airlines,'79 a passenger alleged that he had been injured during an airplane landing. Printed on the face of the
ticket was a statement that the passage was subject to all conditions of contract.6 0 Attached to the ticket was a small booklet which stated that the "time limits for giving notice of
claims and the institution of suit are set forth in the Carrier's
tariff.'

8

'

The passenger did not comply with the ten day no-

tice provision and one year time limit for bringing suit set
forth in the tariff. The federal district court refused to enforce
the conditions because they did not give the passenger sufficient notice. 82 The court recognized that such limitations
could be permissible, but required that the carrier make a
greater effort to notify the passenger of the conditions than
merely incorporating the tariffs terms by reference." 3 The
court viewed the tariff as only a schedule of rates and charges,
in which a reasonable84 man would not expect to find liability
limitations included.

Apparently, Shortley and the cases following it would have
upheld the conditions if they had been set forth on the ticket
in bold print. As mentioned above, air carriers cannot rely on
these conditions because the Board has found them unreasonable. 80 The Board's determination of invalidity will no longer
restrict air passenger carriers, however, when the Board loses
"' Turoff v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 129 F. Supp. 319, 321 (N.D. Il1. 1955); Bernard
v. United States Air Coach, 117 F. Supp. 134, 138 (S.D. Cal. 1953); Toman v. MidContinent Airlines, Inc., 107 F. Supp. 345, 346 (W.D. Mo. 1952); Thomas v. American

Airlines, Inc., 104 F. Supp. 650, 651 (E.D. Ark. 1952); Shortly v. Northwestern Airlines, 104 F. Supp. 152, 155 (D.D.C. 1952); Glenn v. Compania Cubans de Aviacion,
S.A., 102 F. Supp. 631, 634 (S.D. Fla. 1952); Crowell v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 240
N.C. 20, 81 S.E.2d 178, 186 (1954).
178See supra notes 162-66 and accompanying text.
104 F. Supp. 152 (D.D.C. 1952).
Id. at 154.
183

Id.

382

Id.

at 155-56.

Id. at 155.
184

Id.

3"I

See supra note 170 and accompanying text.
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its power to declare practices unreasonable as a result of the
deregulation acts. Other common carriers are regulated by
statute in this respect. 8 6 Any common law restriction on the
ability of air carriers to limit their liability will derive from
notions of notice and unconscionability.
IV.

TICKETS AND BILLS OF LADING AS CONTRACTS OF
ADHESION

A.

Generally
As discussed previously, there has been no pure common
law of common carriers since the early part of this century
when common carriers were free of most regulation.18 7 One
major difference between the common law then and what
courts might apply as common law today has been an in-

creased recognition of so-called "contracts of adhesion."' 88
Such contracts have been defined as standardized forms containing oppressive provisions which are imposed upon the in'" Steamship companies are prohibited from imposing unreasonibly short notice
and commencement of suit conditions by 46 U.S.C. § 183b(a) (1976), which provides:
(a) It shall be unlawful for the manager, agent, master, or owner of any
sea-going vessel (other than tugs, barges, fishing vessels and their tenders) transporting passengers or merchandise or property from or between ports of the United States and foreign ports to provide by rule,
contract, regulation, or otherwise a shorter period for giving notice of,
or filing claims for loss of life or bodily injury, than six months, and for
the institution of suits on such claims, than one year, such period for
institution of suits to be computed from the day when the death or
injury occurred.
Before this section was passed in 1936, some steamship companies imposed extremely
short notice of injury limitation and courts found notice limitations as short as fifteen
days reasonable. See Baron v. Campagnie Generale Transatlantique, 108 F.2d 21, 23
(2d Cir. 1939). Overland carriers are governed by the Interstate Commerce Act, 49
U.S.C. § 20(11) (1976), which provides that:
It shall be unlawful for any such receiving or delivering common carrier to provide by rule, contract, regulation, or otherwise a shorter period for the filing of claims than nine months, and for the institution
of suits than two years, such period for institution of suits to be computed from the day when notice in writing is given by the carrier to
the claimant that the carrier has disallowed the claim or any part or
parts thereof specified in the notice.
,8 See supra note 120 and accompanying text.
'" See generally Kessler, Contracts of Adhesion-Some Thoughts About Freedom
of Contract, 43 COLUM. L. REV. 629 (1943).
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dividual who has no cognizance of their existence. 18 9 Recognition of adhesion contracts involves looking beyond the terms
of the written contract to the surrounding conditions, including the relative bargaining position of the parties. 190 Courts
refusing to recognize contracts of adhesion worry that the
danger of paternalism by the courts is greater than the danger
of enforcing some one-sided bargains. 91
While the adhesiveness of any particular contract may be
difficult to define, courts and commentators have enumerated
certain factors that in combination suggest adhesion. First,
central to an adhesion contract is the use of "boilerplate" language by the party in the stronger bargaining position, who
offers the contract to the party in the weaker bargaining position on a take it or leave it basis.19 2 Second, contracts of adhesion often involve hidden clauses in fine print that are disadvantageous to the party in the weaker bargaining position.9 3
Third, the language of the contract is often incomprehensible
to the layman.' 9 4 Fourth, there is usually an overall imbalance
in the rights and obligations imposed by the contract along
with inequality of bargaining power.'9 5 Finally, the injured
party is often underprivileged and uneducated. 1'1 Some
courts, however, have been quick to point out that inequality
189
"90

J. MURRAY, MURRAY ON CONTRACTS § 350, at 348 (2d ed. 1974).
Id. § 350.

The Supreme Court of Utah summed up this idea when it stated:
People should be entitled to contract on their own terms without the
indulgence of paternalism by courts in the alleviation of one side or
another from the effects of a bad bargain. Also, they should be permitted to enter into contracts that actually may be unreasonable or which
may lead to hardship on one side.
Carlson v. Hamilton, 8 Utah 2d 272, 332 P.2d 989, 990-91 (1958).
192 See Campbell Soup Co. v. Wentz, 172 F.2d 80, 83 (3d Cir. 1948); Henningsen v.
Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69, 87 (1960).
Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 161 A.2d at 87-88.
I' at 88.
Id.
''
See Wheeler v. St. Joseph Hosp., 63 Cal. App. 3d 345, 133 Cal. Rptr. 775 (1976);
Wille v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 219 Kan. 755, 549 P.2d 903, 907 (1976); Weidman
v. Tomaselli, 81 Misc. 2d 328, 365 N.Y.S.2d 681 (Cty. Ct.), aff'd, 84 Misc. 2d 782, 386
N.Y.S.2d 176 (App. Term 1975).
"'

'" See Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445 (D.C. Cir. 1965);
Jones v. Star Credit Corp., 52 Misc. 2d 189, 298 N.Y.S.2d 264 (Sup. Ct. 1969); Jeffer-

son Credit Corp. v. Marcarno, 60 Misc. 2d 138, 302 N.Y.S.2d 390 (Civ. Ct. 1969).
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of bargaining power alone is not enough to make a contract
adhesive. 9 7 Otherwise, the mere fact that an individual contracts with an industrial giant would be enough for the individual to render the contract unenforceable. 198 Some other
proof of unfairness must be demonstrated.
Liability limitations in bills of lading and passenger tickets
are a likely place for some courts today to apply the concepts
of contracts of adhesion. A hurried passenger running for a
plane does not closely examine a ticket for exculpatory
clauses. Shippers, on the other hand, are not rushed into signing a bill of lading, but the provisions may be so complicated
as to be unintelligible. Even if intelligible, the shipper or passenger has no real bargaining power and no real choice if all
carriers have similar exculpatory provisions in their contracts.
The remaining analysis collects cases from areas related to
commercial air travel that indicate that some courts will refuse to uphold air carrier's attempts to limit their liability in
certain situations.
B.

The Admiralty Law Approach

Steamship carriers commonly insert notice and commencement of suit requirements into a detailed contract of carriage,
which is incorporated by reference on the front of the passenger ticket. No tariff system regulates steamship tickets; therefore, the analysis of these provisions is analogous to the analysis of similar airline tickets in the soon to be deregulated air
carrier industry.
The degree to which these incorporations would be binding
on injured passengers was initially examined by the Supreme
Court in The Majestic.9 9 The case involved an exculpatory
clause that limited the carrier's liability for baggage allegedly
damaged. The carrier printed !q'notice to passengers" on the
front of the ticket along with a note to "see back." On the
reverse side of the ticket was a provision in small print limitWille v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 219 Kan. 755, 549 P.2d 903, 907 (1976).
Id. See also Ellinghaus, In Defense of Unconscionability,78 YALE L.J. 757, 76667 (1969).
- 166 U.S. 375 (1897).
"W
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ing the carrier's liability for lost baggage."' The passengers
bringing suit had not read nor had their attention been called
to the limitations. 20 1 The Court refused to limit the carrier's
liability, holding that the reference on the front of the ticket
was not specific enough to incorporate the provisions on the
back. " ' The Court required that "when a company desires to
impose special and most stringent terms upon its customers in
exoneration of its own liability, there is nothing unreasonable
in requiring that the terms should be distinctly declared and
deliberately accepted. 2 0 8 Many courts have followed The Majestic in invalidating similar provisions.0 4
Other courts, however, were reluctant to follow the analysis
in The Majestic. In Murray v. Cunard S.S. Co.,20 5 a passenger
was injured when a ship lurched. The ticket contained notice
and commencement of suit limitations similar to those in The
Majestic.20 6 The court held the conditions to be effective,
finding that the incorporation provision was specific enough to
"wrought in" the limitation on the back of the ticket.2 07 The
court did not find enforcement of the condition laden ticket
inequitable; on the contrary, the court noted that:
This ticket, to the most casual observer, is as plainly a
contract, burdened with all kinds of conditions, as if it were
a bill of lading or a policy of insurance. No one who could
read could glance at it without seeing that it undertook...
to prescribe the particulars which should govern the conduct
of the parties until the passenger reached the port of
208
destination.
More recent cases have placed a greater emphasis on the
00 Id. at 376-78.
01 Id. at 385.
202

Id.

Id. at 386.
0 Maibrunn v. Hamburg-American S.S. Co., 77 F.2d 304 (2d Cir. 1935); Baer v.

2o

North German Lloyd, 69 F.2d 88 (2d Cir. 1934); Toohill v. Cunard S.S. Co., 130 F.
Supp. 128 (D. Mass. 1955).
235 N.Y. 162, 139 N.E. 226 (1923) (Cardozo, J.).
'"
139 N.E. at 228.
207 Id.
Accord Schwartz v. S.S. Nassau, 345 F.2d 465 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 382
U.S. 919 (1965).
1" 139 N.E. at 228.

1982]

AIR CARRIER LIABILITY

carrier's attempt to communicate its conditions to the passenger.2" 9 One court2' " refused to enforce a one year limitation on
filing suit despite the fact that the conditions were printed
upon the face of the ticket so that no incorporation was necessary.2" ' The court refused to enforce the condition on the
ground that it was "not sufficiently eye-catching 1 2 and that
of
the carrier had done nothing "to impress the 2 importance
13
the terms and conditions upon the passenger. 1
Not all recent cases, however, refuse to enforce such provisions. In De Nicola v. Cunard Line Ltd.," 4 a passenger was
injured when a ship lurched in high seas. On the face of the
ticket was a statement directing the passenger to terms and
conditions within an accompanying eighteen page booklet.2 '
The First Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the notice limitations, stating that the central concern was a "sensitive inquiry
into the 'communicativeness' of all warnings of the ticket conditions,' 21 6 but held that the carrier had done all that it
could reasonably do to warn the passenger of the conditions
existence and importance by having had the passenger sign a
separate document which listed
in readable print the terms
21 7
and conditions of contract.
C. Limitations of Liability Under the Warsaw Convention
The Warsaw Convention21 8 governs international aviation
litigation. The reluctance of American courts to enforce the
liability provisions of the Convention without adequate notice
to passengers illustrates a judicial policy against all such lia209 See, e.g., DeNicola v. Cunard Line, Ltd., 642 F.2d 5 (lst Cir. 1981); McQuillan
v. Italia Societa Per Azione Di Navigazione, 386 F. Supp. 462 (S.D.N.Y. 1974), aff'd,
516 F.2d 896 (2d Cir. 1975).
110 Silvestri v. Italia Societa Per Azione Di Navigazione, 388 F.2d 11 (2d Cir. 1968).
IId. at 18.
"' Id.

Id. at 17.
$1 642 F.2d 5 (lst Cir. 1981).
"'

116Id. at 10.
316Id.
217 Id. at 11. See also Carpenter v. Klosters Rederi A/S, 604 F.2d 11 (5th Cir.
1979); Gardner v. Greek Line, 388 F. Supp. 856 (M.D. Pa. 1975); Lipton v. National
Hellenic Am. Lines, 294 F. Supp. 308 (E.D.N.Y. 1968).
"' Supra note 6. See also supra note 159.
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bility limitations. Article three of the Convention requires
that a ticket must be "delivered" if the air carrier is to take
advantage of the Convention's provisions limiting liability.2 "
The delivery of the ticket must include a statement that the
transportation is subject to the rules limiting liability established by the Convention.2 2 Even when a ticket with stated
liability limitations is physically delivered to the passenger,
American courts have refused to consider the ticket delivered
within the meaning of the Convention if the ticket is not reasonably readable so that it gives adequate notice to the passenger of the conditions of carriage.
The first case to find that inadequate notice could constitute failure of delivery was Lisi v. Alitalia-Linee Aeree
Italiane,2 2' which involved an airplane crash in Ireland. The
defendant airline plead the liability limitations under the
Convention. The federal district court read the delivery provision to require that the air carrier afford "the passenger a reasonable opportunity to protect himself against the airline's exclusion or limitation of liability. '222 Applying this rule, the
court found the conditions of contract that were printed on
page five of a ticket booklet in microscopic print to be "un' 22
noticeable, unreadable and virtually invisible. 1
"

Article 3 provides:

(1) For the transportation of passengers the carrier must deliver a passenger ticket which shall contain the following particulars:
(a) The place and date of issue;
(b) The place of departure and of destination;

(c) The agreed stopping places, provided that the carrier may
reserve the right to alter the stopping places in case of necessity,
and that if he exercises that right, the alteration shall not have

the effect of depriving the transportation of its international
character;
(d) The name and address of the carrier or carriers;
(e) A statement that the transportation is subject to the rules
relating to liability established by this convention.
Warsaw Convention, supra note 6, art. 3.
:20 Id.
2' 253 F. Supp. 237 (S.D.N.Y.), affd, 370 F.2d 508 (2d Cir. 1966), aff'd, 390 U.S.
455 (1968).
:11 253 F. Supp. at 239.
13 Id. at 243. The conditions were printed in 41/2 point type which the court characterized as "artfully camouflaged." Id. A dissenting judge in the court of appeals

opinion accused the court of judicial treaty-making. 370 F.2d at 515 (J., Moore, dis-
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Many American courts have followed the rule in Lisi2 2" For
example, Egan v. Kolisman Instrument Corp.2 5 involved a
ticket with very small print, similar to the ticket in Lisi. The
New York Court of Appeals held that "a statement which
cannot reasonably be deciphered fails of its purpose and function of affording notice and may not be accepted as the sort of
22
' 6
statement contemplated or required by the Convention.
The court based its opinion on what it perceived as a "national policy requiring that air carriers give passengers clear
and conspicuous notice before they will be permitted to limit
their liability for injuries caused by their negligence. 2 27 The
court also noted that proper notice would give the passenger
"the opportunity to purchase additional flight insurance or to
take [other additional!e steps for his self-protection. ...
senting). Canada, Italy and the United Kingdom made this same point in amicus
curiae briefs to the Supreme Court. See A. LOWENFELD, supra note 77, ch. 7, § 3.32.
'2
Boryk v. Argentinas, 332 F. Supp. 405 (S.D.N.Y. 1971); Bayless v. S.A. Empress
de Viacao Aerea Rio Grandense, 10 Av. Cas. 17,881 (S.D.N.Y. 1968); Egen v. Kollsman Instrument Corp., 21 N.Y.2d 160, 234 N.E.2d 199, 287 N.Y.S.2d 14 (1967), cert.
denied, 390 U.S. 1039 (1968); Greenberg v. United Airlines, 98 Misc. 2d 44, 424
N.Y.S.2d 240 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1979). Compare Lisi v. Alitalia-Linee Aeree Italiane, 253
F. Supp. 237 (S.D.N.Y.), afl'd, 370 F.2d 508 (2d Cir. 1966), aff'd, 340 U.S. 455 (1968)
(holding that 41/2 point print was unreadable) with Millikin Trust Co. v. Iberia Lineas Aereas de Espana, S. A., 11 Av. Cas. 17,331, 17,333 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1969) (holding
that notice was sufficient, stating "the notice contained on the ticket in this instance
is at least in print twice the size of that contained in Lisi ... [t]he eight point print
is easily readable and quickly noticable"). Several American cases, however, have refused to extend the reasoning of Lisi to domestic air cases. See Sechler v. Trans
World Airlines, Inc., 12 Av. Cas. 18,185 (Cal. App. 1973); Robert v. Pan American
World Airways, Inc., 71 Misc. 2d 991, 337 N.Y.S.2d 891 (App. Term 1972), aff'd, 42
A.D.2d 929, 347 N.Y.S.2d 1001 (1973); Martin v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 219 Pa.
Super. 42, 280 A.2d 647 (1971); Parker v. Pan American World Airways, 447 S.W.2d
731 (Tex. Civ. App.- Dallas 1969, no writ). Cf. Montreal Trust Co. v. Canadian Pac.
Air Lines, Ltd., 72 D.L.R.3d 257 (Can. 1976), in which the Canadian Supreme Court
held that microscopic print did not constitute sufficient notice under the provisions of
the Warsaw Convention.
"2 21 N.Y.2d 160, 234 N.E.2d 199, 287 N.Y.S.2d 14 (1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S.
1039 (1968).
:20 Id. at 169, 234 N.E.2d at 203, 287 N.Y.S.2d at 19-20.
" Id. at 171, 234 N.E.2d at 204, 287 N.Y.S.2d at 21-22.
228Id. at 170, 234 N.E.2d at 204, 287 N.Y.S.2d at 21. Cf. Lisi v. Alitalia-Linee
Aeree Italiane, 370 F.2d 508, 512-13 (2d Cir. 1966), aff'd, 390 U.S. 455 (1968).
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D.

Unconscionability Under the Uniform Commercial
Code
Article two of the Uniform Commercial Code (U.C.C.) 2"9
specifically authorizes a court not to enforce unconscionable
contractual clauses. Section 2-302 provides:
If the court as a matter of law finds that the contract or any
clause of the contract to have been unconscionable at the time
it was made the court may refuse to enforce the contract, or it
may enforce the remainder of the contract without the unconscionable clause, or it may so limit the application of any un2 0
conscionable clause as to avoid any unconscionable result.

While the U.C.C. applies only to the sale of goods, it purports
to explicitly codify practices of the common law231 and is influential outside of the sales area.23
Section 2-302 does not expressly define unconscionability,
nor attempt to enumerate factors constituting unconscionability. A comment to the provision attempts to provide some illumination, stating that "[t]he principle is one of prevention
of unfair surprise," but not "the disturbance of allocation of
risks because of superior bargaining power. 23 3 A distinction
has been drawn between procedural unconscionability, which
relates to matters leading up to the formation of a contract,
"2 Article two of the Uniform Commercial Code has been adopted in every state
except Louisiana. J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 1 (2d ed.
1980) [hereinafter cited as WHITE & SUMMERS].

U.C.C. § 2-302(1) (1978).
3' U.C.C. § 2-302, comment 1 (1978).
232 The RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS has recently adopted an unconscionability provision based upon U.C.C. § 2-302 (1978) and the case law decided thereunder. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 208 (1981). A comment to the Restatement provision provides:
Uniform Commercial Code § 2-302 is literally inapplicable to contracts
not involving the sale of goods, but it has proven very influential in
non-sales cases. It has many times been used either by analogy or because it was felt to embody a generally accepted social attitude of fairness going beyond its statutory application to sales of goods.
Id. comment a. Section 2-302 is cited more often in non-commercial cases, but U.C.C.
§ 2-719 (1978), which expressly provides that limitations on consequential damages
may be unconsionable, may also be applied by analogy. See, e.g., Shippers Nat'l
Freight Claim Council, Inc. v. United Airlines, Inc., 15 Av. Cas. 17,439, 17,441 (D.D.C.
1978) (Suggesting U.C.C. § 2-302 was applicable to airline contracts of carriage).
1.
U.C.C. § 2-302, comment 1 (1978).
:80
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and substantive unconscionability, which relates to terms of
the contract.23
An instrumental case in interpreting Section 2-302, Williams v. Walker Thomas Furniture Co.,2 35 identified uncon-

scionability as including "an absence of meaningful choice on
the part of one of the parties together with contract terms
which are unreasonably favorable to the other party. 2

36

The

court further noted that ordinarily one who signs an agreement without full knowledge of its terms is held to assume the
risk of entering a one-sided bargain, but that when a party
with little bargaining power enters into a contract, he does so
without any real choice, so it is unlikely that consent was actually given.23 7 The "meaningful choice" may be interpreted

as referring to procedural unconscionability, while the "unreasonably favorable" language may refer to substantive
8
unconscionability.

23

Other courts interpreting Section 2-302 have not been so
quick to find contractual provisions to be unconscionable. In
Wille v. Southwestern Bell Telephone Co., 23 9 a businessman

contracted with a public telephone company to provide advertising in a telephone book. The telephone company, however,
printed the wrong number and as a result, the businessman
24 0
was forced to purchase other, more expensive advertising.
The businessman sued the telephone company for the additonal cost and the telephone company defended with an exculpatory clause that was printed on the back of the advertis241
ing contract.
234

See Frank's Maintenance & Engineering, Inc. v. C.A. Roberts Co., 86 Ill.
App. 3d
980, 408 N.E.2d 403 (1980); Schroeder v. Fageol Motors, Inc., 86 Wash. 2d, 544 P.2d
20 (1975); WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 229, at 151; Left, Unconscionability and
the Code-The Emperor's New Clause, 115 U. PA. L. REV. 485, 487 (1967).
:36 350 F.2d 445 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
,5GId. at 449.
7s'
Id. The court refused to enforce a complex cross-collateralization clause in a
contract to purchase appliances between the appliance dealer and a mother on welfare with seven children. Id. at 447-48.
'" See WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 229, at 152.
:39 219 Kan. 755, 549 P.2d 903 (1976).
*40 549 P.2d at 904-05.

Id. at 905.
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The Kansas Supreme Court held that the exculpatory
clause was not unconscionable. First, the court found no actual disparity in bargaining power, for the businessman could
have contracted with other advertisers.2 42 Second, the court
found no unfair surprise, because the exculpatory clause was
clearly printed in easily understandable language.2 43 Third,
the court did not think that enforcement of the clause would
"shock the conscience," because the clause was reasonably inserted by the telephone company to prevent damages specula24 4
tive in nature.
The factors enumerated in Williams could be applied to a
provision limiting liability in a contract of air carriage. Liability limitation provisions that are printed in small type or incorporated by reference may constitute procedural unconscionability by depriving a party of a meaningful choice. In
addition, if all air carriers have similar contracts, then the single passenger or shipper again has no real bargaining power.
Liability limitation provisions may also be substantively unconscionable if they unreasonably limit a party's remedies for
breach of contract. On the other hand, a court following the
analysis in Southwestern Bell would probably uphold liability
limitation in a contract of carriage so long as it was clearly
printed and had a reasonable purpose. Such a court would
probably not be concerned with the passenger's lack of bargaining power.
V.

CONCLUSION

In abolishing the tariff system, Congress apparently did not
consider the specific effect that deregulation would have on
the ability of air carriers to limit their liability contractually.
Congress did intend for market forces to efficiently regulate
rates and practices. 24'5 While rates and some carrier practices
will be influenced by market forces, the same will not hold
true for liability limitations. Such limitations are rarely even
:11 Id. at 910.
'

Id.

"4
','

Id.

See supra notes 79-80 and accompanying text.
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noticed by passengers and shippers, much less used as a basis
for choosing a carrier.
The greatest potential problem with the deregulation of liability limitations will be the resulting lack of predictability.
Whatever problems existed with regulation by the Board, the
courts' deferral to the Board's determination of the reasonableness or unreasonableness of liability limitations led to uniformity of interpretation. From the air carriers' point of view,
the existence of a predictable rule is as important as the substance of any particular rule. In the absence of federal legislation, air carriers in interstate commerce will be forced to comply with divergent state standards when various state rules
are no longer preempted by the Board's authority.2" The air
carriers will need to make some greater effort to inform passengers and shippers of terms and conditions of carriage than
by the current practice of incorporating a tariff by reference,
but different courts will enforce differing standards of readability and notice. If all of an air carrier's provisions relating to
baggage, rerouting and delays must be supplied to each passenger and shipper, then the ticketing, boarding and shipping
processes will become much more complicated and expensive.
From the consumer's point of view, passengers and shippers
will need some protection from the possibility of some air carriers instituting unacceptable risk shifting practices. Without
the Board's policing supervision, very short notice and commencement of suit limitations could be upheld for the first
time in many years.2 47 Moreover, when current regulations

concerning minimum released rule clauses limiting an air carrier's liability for property damage are no longer in effect,
some air carriers could attempt to severely limit their losses.
U4

The Airline Deregulation Act does include a preemptive provision prohibiting

states from affecting the !q'law relating to rates, routes, or services" of any interstate
carrier. 49 U.S.C. § 1305 (Supp. IV 1980). The legislative history of the Act, however,
does not indicate that Congress intended to include liability limitations as "rates."
REPORT, supra note 72, at 98-100. Cf. Hughes Air Corp. v. Public Utilities Comm. of
Cal., 644 F.2d 1334 (9th Cir. 1981) (prohibiting a state agency from regulating the
rates, routes and services of a commuter carrier exempted from regulation by the
Board).
"I See supra notes 161-86 and accompanying text.
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So long as these limitations on liability are conspiciously included in contracts of carriage, they could be enforced in
court."
One possible solution to these problems would be for Congress to reverse its decision to abolish the Board. This seems
unlikely, for most members of Congress are apparently satisfied with deregulation and its effects.2 49 A second possibility
would be to legislate specifically against some potential
abuses. Other common carriers are governed by statutes imposing minimum notice and commencement of suit limitations 50 and Congress could similarly provide for air carriers in
this manner. However, statutory regulation of readability and
noticability of conditions of carriage, as well as statutory regulation in changing carrier practices, would be impracticable.
An overall solution would be to transfer some policing authority to another federal agency. The Board currently prohibits "unfair or deceptive practices" under section 411 of the
Act.2 ' This function of the Board is not among those to be
transferred to other federal agencies upon the Board's sunset.2 52 This function could easily be transferred to either the
Department of Transportation or the Federal Trade Commission." The Federal Trade Commission has the advantage of
already having a similar provision in its enabling act 2 54 and
currently regulates the deceptive practices of some other common carriers. 255
Transfer of such authority to another federal agency would
be a reinstitution of the Board's previous broad powers in another agency. The regulation of deceptive practices is much
narrower than the Board's previous authority to regulate
:40 See supra notes 214-17 and accompanying text.
" See Airline Woes Not Linked to Deregulation,40 CONG. Q. 1260 (1982).

:" See supra note 186.
51 49 U.S.C. § 1381 (1976). Under this section the Board regulated air carrier prac-

tices such as oversales. 14 C.F.R. § 250 (1982).
"
See supra notes 66-68 and accompanying text.
,' See generally Mclnnis, Introduction to Legislative Issues Relating to Transfer

or Elimination of CAB Functions After CAB Sunset, in
TRANSPORTATION INDUSTRY 303 (1981).
''

15 U.S.C. § 45 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).

"'

Id..
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"rates and practices." Under this limited authority, a successor agency could promulgate acceptable rules concerning the
noticability and readability of contract of carriage terms, as
well as other limitations on liability.

